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Executive Summary 53
There are several emerging areas in which highly constrained devices are interconnected, 54 working in concert to accomplish some task. Examples of these areas include: automotive 55 systems, sensor networks, healthcare, distributed control systems, the Internet of Things (IoT), 56 cyber-physical systems, and the smart grid. Security and privacy can be very important in all of 57 these areas. Because the majority of modern cryptographic algorithms were designed for 58 desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms cannot be implemented in the 59 constrained devices used by these applications. When current NIST-approved algorithms can be 60 engineered to fit into the limited resources of constrained environments, their performance may 61 not be acceptable. For these reasons, NIST started a lightweight cryptography project that was 62 tasked with learning more about the issues and developing a strategy for the standardization of 63 lightweight cryptographic algorithms. 64
This report provides an overview of lightweight cryptography, summarizes the findings of the 65 NIST's lightweight cryptography project, and outlines NIST's plans for the standardization of 66 lightweight primitives. In particular, NIST has decided to create a portfolio of lightweight 67
primitives through an open process similar to the selection of block cipher modes of operation. 68 Algorithms will be recommended for use only in the context of profiles, which describe physical, 69 performance, and security characteristics. These profiles are intended to capture cryptographic 70 algorithm requirements imposed by devices and applications where lightweight cryptography is 71 needed. NIST will develop profiles based on community responses to questions, included in this 72 report, about application and device requirements for lightweight cryptography. 73 iv 
Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives 219
Over the last decade, a number of lightweight crypto primitives (including block ciphers, hash 220 functions, message authentication codes and stream ciphers) have been proposed to bring 221 performance advantages over conventional cryptographic standards. These primitives differ from 222 conventional algorithms with the assumptions that lightweight primitives are not intended for a 223 wide range of applications, and may impose limits on the power of the attacker. For example, the 224 amount of data available to the attacker under a single key may be limited. However, it should be 225 noted that this does not mean that the lightweight algorithms are weak -rather the idea is to use 226 advancements to result in designs with a better balance between security, performance, and 227 resource requirements for specific resource-constrained environments. 228
Lightweight Block Ciphers 229
A number of lightweight block ciphers have been proposed to achieve performance advantages 230 over NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [63] , particularly AES-128. Some of these 231 ciphers were designed by simplifying conventional, well-analyzed block ciphers to improve their 232 efficiency. As an example, DESL [42] NIST's Lightweight Cryptography Project 369 NIST develops standards using several different approaches, as described in [50] . NIST has held 370 competitions to select the AES block cipher and the SHA-3 hash functions. These competitions 371 were significant efforts that took place over many years. For example, the SHA-3 competition 372 was announced in 2007, the winner was announced in 2012, and the standardization process was 373 concluded in 2015. Another approach is to adapt standards of other accredited standards 374 development organizations, as was done with HMAC and RSA standards. NIST researchers also 375 develop standards and guidelines in collaboration with experts in academia, industry and 376 government, if no suitable standard exists. 377
The landscape for lightweight cryptography is moving so quickly that a standard produced using 378 the competition model is likely to be outdated prior to standardization. Therefore, the most 379 suitable approach for lightweight cryptography, in terms of timeline and project goals, is to 380 develop new recommendations using an open call for proposals to standardize algorithms. 381
NIST is planning to develop and maintain a portfolio of lightweight primitives and modes that 382 are approved for limited use. Each algorithm in the portfolio will be tied to one or more profiles, 383 which consist of algorithm goals and acceptable ranges for metrics. This is in contrast to other 384 primitives and modes that are approved for general use. Any restrictions on use will be included 385 in the recommendation or standard where the primitives and modes of the portfolio are specified. 386
Algorithm transitions and deprecation guidance will be provided as algorithms in the portfolio 387 are phased out. The lightweight portfolio is not intended to offer alternative algorithms for 388 general use. 389
Scope and Design Considerations 390
The scope of NIST's lightweight cryptography project includes all cryptographic primitives and 391 modes that are needed in constrained environments. However, the initial focus of the project is 392 on block ciphers, hash functions, and message authentication codes. When long-term security is 393 needed, these algorithms should either aim for post-quantum security [49] , or the application 394 should allow them to be easily replaceable by algorithms with post-quantum security. 395
While public key cryptography is not included in the initial focus, it is within the scope of this 396
project. However, it should be noted that public key schemes will only be considered for 397 inclusion in the portfolio under two conditions: 1) they are robust against quantum attacks, or 2) 398 use a combination of general public key cryptographic schemes with lightweight primitives (e.g., 399
lightweight hash function). Protocol design is also an important part of achieving the desired 400 level of security while meeting requirements of a constrained environment, but is not within the 401 scope of this project. 402
General Design Considerations 403
While specific requirements vary by application, there are several generally desired properties 404 that NIST will be using to evaluate designs. can be justified for some applications by the constraints of the devices, (e.g., limitations on 435 the amount of data that are processed by the same key), or message formats defined by 436 protocols. However, it must be recognized that an attacker may mount attacks using plaintext 437 that was encrypted under multiple, independent keys (multi-key attacks), which are relevant 438 even when the amount of data encrypted under any single key is limited. 439 -Related-key attacks: These attacks allow an adversary to discover information about a key 440 by performing operations using multiple keys that, although unknown, have a known 441 relation. This is particularly a threat in protocols where keys are not chosen independent and 442 at random. Keys may be permanently burned into the hardware of constrained devices, with 443 no means of replacement. If this is the case, then related key attacks are only a practical 444 threat if an adversary can obtain several devices that have keys with a known relation. This 445 11 attack model still remains highly relevant for devices where the capability to update the key 446 exists. The algorithms are expected to provide some resistance to related key attacks (e.g., 447
attacks require large number of related keys). 448
It may not be possible to satisfy all properties, in particular when this increases the resources 449 beyond what is available for a given application. Still, any algorithm selected for the portfolio 450 must provide adequate security. In particular, the security against key-recovery attacks should be 451 at least 112 bits. 452
Profiles 453
NIST will evaluate and recommend algorithms based on profiles, which consist of a set of design 454 goals, physical characteristics of target devices, performance characteristics imposed by the 455 applications, and security characteristics. 456
Cryptographic primitives can be designed with a variety of goals in mind. 
Design goals
List design goals.
531
The following sample profiles are provided for example purposes only. Profiles for inclusion in 532 the portfolio will be developed with the community in an open process. Sample applications are 533
provided, but selected algorithms should be suitable for a variety of applications. 534
Sample Profile #1 535
The first sample profile is for a MAC algorithm having a low-area implementation in hardware, 536
and is designed for short input messages. 537 538 14
Profile Sample_1
Primitive MAC Physical characteristics 1600 to 1900 GEs, ASIC hardware implementation
Performance characteristics Latency ≤ 15 ns
Security characteristics 128-bit security, resistance to related key attacks, timing analysis
Design goals
Efficient for short input messages 539 A sample application using profile Sample_1 would be an RFID tag for asset tracking. 540 541
Sample Profile #2 542
The second sample profile is for an authenticated encryption algorithm with low latency. The 543 implementation may be in hardware or software, but should allow for decryption/verification. 544
Profile Sample_2

Primitive
Block cipher
Physical characteristics
Hardware or software implementation
Performance characteristics Latency ≤ 20 ns
Security characteristics 128-bit security, resistance to power analysis
Design goals
Authenticated encryption
545
A sample application using profile Sample_2 would be command validation on a Controller Area 546 Network (CAN) bus. 547
Sample Profile #3 548
The third sample profile is for a MAC algorithm that uses minimal power. 549
Profile Sample_3
Primitive MAC
Physical characteristics
Hardware implementation
Performance characteristics
Power ≤ 10 µW Security characteristics 128-bit security, resistance against related key attacks, power analysis
Design goals
Resistance against tag forgeries A sensor network node is an example of an application that may be compatible with profile 550
Sample_3. Note that the same algorithm might be associated with both this profile and profile 551 Sample_1. 552
Evaluation process 553
NIST will develop a submission and evaluation process for lightweight cryptographic algorithms 554 that is similar to that of block cipher modes project [48] . There will be an open call for profiles 555 and lightweight cryptographic algorithms. The submission requirements, guidelines, and sets of 556 evaluation criteria will be made public on the Lightweight Cryptography project page 557 (http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/lwc-project.cfm). 558
NIST will periodically hold workshops to discuss lightweight algorithms that are under 559 consideration for the portfolio. These workshops will seek input from the community on 560 cryptanalysis, implementations, and applications of the proposals. 561
The lwc-forum@nist.gov emailing list has been established for dialogue regarding NIST's 562 Lightweight Cryptography project. To subscribe to the NIST lightweight cryptography mailing 563 list, send an email message to lwc-forum-request@nist.gov, with a subject line "subscribe". 564
Tentative timeline: 565 -NIST solicits answers to the included list of questions about requirements from the 566 community, based on current and upcoming application and device needs. Responses to 567 the questions should be sent to lightweight-crypto@nist.gov with the subject line 568 "Responses to questions on lightweight crypto requirements" before October 1, 2016. 569 NIST will develop profiles based on the answers it receives, and these profiles will 570 provide a starting point for discussion and call for primitives. 571 -NIST will hold the second Lightweight Cryptography Workshop on October 17-18, 2016. 572
The purpose of this workshop will be to discuss this document, proposed profiles, 573 comparison tools and methods, and recent work on cryptanalysis and implementations of 574 lightweight cryptographic designs. 575 -NIST will publish a call for submissions of lightweight primitives in early 2017. The call 576 will request submissions that are good solutions for the specified profiles. 577 16 -In late 2017, approximately six months after the call is published, NIST will begin 578 reviewing proposals. 579 -NIST will hold the third Lightweight Cryptography Workshop in early 2018 to discuss 580 proposals and plans for standardization. 581
